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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether corporate disclosure behavior is “sticky” and if so, why.  From the 
Company Issued Guidance database created by Thompson First Call, 1,085 firm-years in which a 
firm skips a year of earnings forecast are identified.  Based on a logit analysis, three potential 
reasons for that skip are explored: 1) the company missed its earnings target in the prior year, 2) 
they experienced more earnings volatility than expected, and 3) they received incoming bad news.  
The results show that a firm is more likely to skip if it missed its earnings target by a large margin 
in the prior year.  The results also suggest that this occurs in cases where a firm experiences 
higher earnings volatility.  Incoming bad news is not a factor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he behavior surrounding management earnings guidance has long been a topic of interest to 
academic researchers.  While most studies focus on examining the determinants and the 
consequences of management earnings forecast behavior (e.g., Waymire, 1985; Pownall, et. al., 1993; 
Baginski & Hassell, 1997; Coller & Yohn, 1997), little is known about time-series changes in management earnings 
forecast behavior. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this void by addressing the following two questions: 1) does a firm 
consistently project its earnings number from period to period, and 2) if not, what causes the inconsistency? 
 
Based upon the Company Issued Guidance database created by Thomson First Call, the years in which a 
firm skips its annual earnings forecast are identified; more specifically, any gaps in year(s) in which a firm suddenly 
drops an earnings forecast.  The sample years investigated lie between 1993 and 2007.  Limiting to those firms 
where the fiscal year ends in December, 1,168 firm-years in which management earnings forecast are skipped were 
identified.  To make sure these firm-years actually skipped their annual earnings forecast, the newswires and the 
final number of skipped firm-years were checked, thereby identifying a final number of 1,085.  Among these, about 
forty percent of skipped forecasts occurred in 1999, 2000, and 2002. 
 
The fact that firms can skip a year of earnings forecast casts doubt on an argument posited by prior studies.  
Previous studies suggest that firms’ disclosure policies tend to be “sticky” (Bushee, et. al., 2003; Skinner, 2003; 
Graham, et. al., 2004; Field, et. al., 2005).  They argue that some firms have a long-standing policy to provide 
frequent earnings guidance while other firms stay with a tradition of non-disclosure.  The findings in this study 
imply that disclosure policies could be less “sticky” than researchers commonly believe. 
 
Exploring potential reasons that cause a firm to skip a year of earnings forecast results in hypotheses that 
firms are more likely to engage in this practice if 1) they missed earnings targets in a previous year, 2) they 
experienced more volatile earnings, or 3) they received incoming bad news.  To test these hypotheses, firm-years 
with complete financial data were examined and the following samples were identified: 690 skipped firm-years and 
3,197 regular forecasting control firm-years.  Based on a logit analysis, the findings indicate that firms that have 
missed earnings targets in a previous year are more likely to skip.  The results also show that firms with more 
T 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – June 2013   Volume 11, Number 6 
260 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
volatile earnings in the previous five years are more inclined to do so.  The results, however, do not suggest that 
firms with incoming bad news are more likely to skip. 
 
By providing a time-series analysis of management earnings forecast behavior, this research casts doubt on 
a common belief that disclosure policy tends to be sticky.   
 
This study complements two related studies by Houston, et. al. (2010) and Chen, et. al. (2011).  Both 
studies investigate time-series change in management earnings forecast behavior.  However, their focus is on firms 
that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance, while the focal point here is on firms that skip a year of forecast.  
Sample firms within this study actually exclude firms that permanently stop their forecasts. 
 
STICKY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE POLICY 
 
To explore whether a firm would actually skip a year of earnings forecast, the Company Issued Guidance 
(CIG) database generated by Thomson First Call was used as a test bed.  The initial sample is limited to all forecasts 
about annual earnings per share (EPS) issued by management between calendar years 1993 and 2007.  The sample 
firms are restricted to those with fiscal year ending December 31 to ease data collection.  For a given firm, the year(s) 
in which it skips making a forecast number is/are identified.  For example, if a firm has earnings forecast for years 
1996 and 1997 and then makes its next earnings forecast for year 1999 or after, 1998  is considered a skip year.  The 
year in which a firm completely stops its earnings forecast is not included. 
 
Among 937 firms, 1,168 firm-years in which a firm skips its earnings forecast were isolated.  Since 
Anilowski et. al. (2007) indicate that the CIG database is incomplete, Factiva news database was searched to make 
sure that initially identified cases actually skipped annual earnings forecast.  For each skipped year, all news hits 
were browsed under the keyword phrase “earnings projection.”   The time period of the Factiva examination ranges 
from the time a firm last made its annual earnings forecast to four months after the fiscal year end of a skipped year.  
The publications searched include Business Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press Newswires, and Reuters 
Significant Developments.  Of the CIG-identified skipped firm-years, 83 actually had annual earnings forecasts.  The 
final number of skipped firm-years is 1,085 among 885 firms. 
 
Table 1:  Characteristics of Skipped Management Earnings Forecasts and Skipped Firms 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics Of Firm Size And Income Before Extraordinary Items For The 1,086 Firm-Years That A Firm 
Skips An Earnings Forecast (Versus All Other Firm-Years With Fiscal year-End In December But Excluding Skipped Firm-
Years) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Size 
  Skipped firm-years 1,396,425 12,498,331 1,555 9,345 65,167 
  Other firm-years 1,236,777 18,315,917 164 1,449 16,949 
Income before extraordinary items 
  Skipped firm-years 153.79 870.49 -1.13 18.31 90.71 
  Other firm-years 121.25 913.55 -2.62 4.96 39.14 
  
Panel B:  Relative Percentage Of Bad News* Firm-Years And Loss** Firm-Years 
 Firm-Years Skipped Other Firm-Years 
Bad news 41.01% 36.04% 
Loss  26.08% 32.18% 
* A firm-year is classified as a bad news firm-year when the current year’s income, before extraordinary items, is less than last 
year’s. 
** A firm-year is viewed as a loss firm-year if the income before extraordinary items is less than zero.   
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Panel C:  Frequency Of Skipped Management Earnings Forecasts By Year 
Year Number Of  Skipped Firm-Years % 
1994 1 0.09 
1995 12 1.11 
1996 84 7.74 
1997 85 7.83 
1998 101 9.31 
1999 135 12.44 
2000 174 16.04 
2001 89 8.20 
2002 128 11.80 
2003 103 9.49 
2004 54 4.98 
2005 72 6.64 
2006 34 3.13 
2007 13 1.20 
Total 1085 100.00 
 
Panel D:  Industry Composition 
Industry Groups* % Of Skipped Firm-Years % Of Other Firm-Years 
aero 0.46 0.35 
agric 0.55 0.21 
autos 2.49 1.12 
banks 7.38 14.23 
beer 0.46 0.31 
bldmt 1.75 1.49 
books 0.92 0.74 
boxes 0.46 0.25 
bussv 16.97 10.49 
chems 2.21 1.64 
chips 4.52 4.35 
clths 1.75 0.82 
cnstr 1.11 0.99 
coal 0.37 0.18 
comps 3.41 3.25 
drugs 5.26 6.08 
elceq 1.29 0.66 
enrgy 2.49 4.52 
fabpr 0.37 0.28 
fin 1.85 6.24 
food 0.65 0.84 
fun 0.83 1.29 
gold 0.18 0.86 
gov 0.18 0.16 
hlth 2.40 1.71 
hshld 2.31 1.17 
insur 4.61 4.46 
labeq 1.57 1.56 
mach 3.60 2.43 
meals 1.75 1.63 
medeq 3.41 2.57 
mines 0.37 0.63 
misc 0.46 0.89 
paper 1.48 1.13 
persv 1.20 0.68 
rlest 0.37 0.89 
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rtail 2.12 1.99 
rubbr 0.83 0.72 
ships 0.46 0.14 
smoke 0.09 0.15 
soda 0.28 0.24 
steel 1.29 1.33 
telcm 1.85 4.16 
toys 1.11 0.77 
trans 3.41 2.74 
txtls 0.46 0.34 
util 4.15 3.72 
whlsl 2.49 2.60 
Total 100.00 100.00 
* Firm-years are classified into different industry groups according to the industry classification proposed by Fama and French 
(1997). 
 
Panel E:  Percentage Of Firms Which Repeatedly Skip A Year Of Earnings Forecast 
Number Of Earnings Forecast Skipped Number Of Firms Percentage 
4 1 0.11 
3 23 2.60 
2 151 17.06 
1 710 80.23 
Total 885 100.00 
 
In Table 1, Panel A indicates that the mean (median) size, measured as the market value of equity at the 
end of each year, of the skipped firm-years is $1,396,425 ($9,345), while the mean (median) size of other firm-years 
is $1,236,777 ($1,449).  In other words, the size of firms that skip years of earnings forecasts is, on average, larger.  
This could be because a larger firm tends to make earnings forecasts in the first place.  It could also imply that a 
large firm is more likely to skip a year of forecast. 
 
In Table 1, Panel B shows that forty-one percent of the skipped firm-years occur in the same years as those 
in which a firm experiences bad news, while only thirty-six percent of other firm-years experience bad news.  This 
could indicate that a firm skips a year of forecast because its current performance is not as good as in the previous 
year.  On the other hand, skipping a year of forecast is not necessarily related to reporting a loss in that year.  Only 
26.08% of skipped firm-years are coincident with reports of losses in the same year, which is lower than the 
percentage (32.18%) of other firm-years where there were reported losses. 
 
In Table 1, Panels C and D show the frequency of skipped incidences by year and industry composition 
(Fama & French, 1997).  About forty percent of the incidences occurred in 1999, 2000, and 2002.  Furthermore, the 
firms that skip forecast years are mostly in the prepackaged software service industry, the banking industry, and the 
pharmaceutical industry (SIC codes = 7372, 6020 and 2834, respectively.  They are included in the business services 
(bussv), banking (banks), and drugs industry (drugs) categories, respectively. 
 
Another investigation was undertaken to determine whether incidences where firms skip forecast years 
occur around the same time as turnovers of chief executive officers (CEO), chief financial officers (CFO), or 
auditors.  It was discovered that 27.28% (296 out of 1,085) of skipped firm-years occurred in the same period when 
CEOs or CFOs turned over (not tabulated).  Among these 296 firm-years, 37.16% of the turnover resulted from the 
resignation of a CEO or CFO.  Furthermore, for 10.32% (112 out of 1,085) of skipped firm-years, a firm’s change in 
its auditor occurred in the same year as or in the prior year to the skipped firm-year. 
 
Prior studies believe that a firm is sticky in relation to its disclosure policy.  In other words, if a firm holds 
a conference call or provides an earnings forecast in a given year, it is a common belief that it will do so consistently 
over time.  The finding that a firm will actually skip a year of earnings guidance casts doubt on this common belief.  
Although a firm may have a long-standing corporate disclosure policy, the choice of whether to make voluntary 
disclosure could still change over a series of years.  In the next section, several reasons that might cause a firm to 
skip a year of forecast are proposed. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The concern that a firm might miss its earnings target for a second or subsequent year might trigger the 
firm to skip a year of forecast.  A recent survey study indicates that managers believe that missing an earnings 
benchmark could cause a stock price to plummet (Graham, et. al., 2005).  Empirical evidence also supports these 
managers’ beliefs.  For example, Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that growth firms that miss their earnings target (e.g., 
analysts’ forecasts) exhibit disproportionately large stock price declines.  In addition, Bartov, et. al. (2002) show that 
firms that fail to meet analysts’ earnings expectations experience a lower abnormal return than firms that meet these 
expectations.  This concern about dragging down the stock price because of a missed earnings target could result in 
the firm deciding to skip a year of forecast. 
 
Managers might also be worried about their external reputation from the firm’s missing its earnings target 
and this could cause them to skip a year of forecast.  Graham et. al. (2005) point out this concern on the part of 
managers.  If managers fail to meet earnings benchmarks in a given year, they may choose to keep silent for the next 
year in order not to affect their reputation and careers in a negative way.  From the discussion above, the following 
hypothesis (in an alternative form) is suggested: 
 
H1: Firms which miss earnings targets are more likely to skip a year of earnings forecast. 
 
Early theoretical work (e.g., Grossman, 1981) suggested that firms would practice a full disclosure policy 
because it would be assumed that a firm that withheld information would do so as a result of bad news, resulting in 
full disclosure equilibrium.  Despite this argument, subsequent disclosure models proposed by Dye (1985) and Jung 
and Kwon (1988) argued that partial disclosure equilibrium could exist because of the information uncertainty in the 
environment surrounding the time a firm made its disclosure.  Their argument is that while information uncertainty 
exists, investors are unsure whether the manager has certain information. This, in turn, allows managers to 
successfully suppress information they possess.  In other words, the higher the uncertainty about information, the 
more likely a firm can successfully withhold information without unraveling the nature of the withheld news. 
 
A firm could choose to withhold a year of earnings forecast due to information uncertainty about earnings.   
Such information uncertainty about earnings could result from the volatility of earnings in the prior year.  The 
survey study by Graham et. al. (2005) points out a widely held managerial belief that earnings volatility reduces 
earnings predictability.  Therefore, if a firm’s earnings number becomes too volatile to be predicted reasonably, the 
manager could decide to keep silent for that year.  The hypothesis (in alternative form) is stated as follows: 
 
H2:  Firms with more volatile earnings are more likely to skip a year of earnings forecast. 
 
In addition to earnings volatility, Verrecchia (1983) proposed two reasons why a firm withholds 
information: 1) A firm might experience good news, but the proprietary cost of disclosing it might be greater than 
the benefit or 2) a firm experiences bad news.  In line with this view, empirical studies generally find a positive 
relationship between firm performance and disclosure (e.g., Land & Lundholm, 1993; Miller, 2002). 
 
If a firm expects a poor earnings number in the current year compared to the preceding year, it might not be 
motivated to release earnings guidance with the hope that earnings performance could revert to last year’s level 
before it is finalized.  In other words, giving out any precise and optimistic earnings guidance could mislead the 
market if the final earnings result is expected to be particularly bad.  Thus, a firm could be inclined to keep silent in 
such a circumstance.  The following directional prediction is proposed (in alternative form): 
 
H3:  Firms with incoming bad news are more likely to skip a year of earnings forecast. 
 
In summary, firms with a record of missing earnings targets, more volatile earnings, and/or incoming bad 
news are inclined to miss a year of earnings forecast.  The procedure for selecting sample firms and control firms is 
described in the next section. 
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METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE SELECTION, AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
To test potential reason(s) that could cause a firm to skip a year of earnings forecast, logit analysis was 
used.  The CIG database was chosen to identify a group of control firm-years.  With the sample period ranging from 
years 1993 to 2007, if a firm with a December fiscal year-end actually issued annual earnings forecast in a year, that 
year is included as a control firm-year.  The number of regular forecasting firm-years identified was 11,948.   
 
The logit model used in the test is as follows: 
 
)()1Pr( 43210   LSIZEBADVOLATILEMISSFSKIP  
 
The dependent variable SKIP is 1 if a firm actually skips a year of forecast.  The SKIP is 0 if a firm issues a 
forecast that year.  F( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.   
 
MISS is the magnitude of missing earnings target.  The earnings target chosen for focus is the number from 
analysts’ earnings forecast (McAnally, et. al. 2008).  Thus MISS is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between diluted EPS (Compustat #57) and the last analyst’s median forecast number before earnings announcement 
(I/B/E/S MEDEST), deflated by stock price per share (Compustat #199).  In addition, earnings volatility is measured 
as VOLATILE - the standard deviation of deflated earnings within the five years preceding the skipped year in which 
deflated earnings is considered to be earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123) over the end-of-year 
total assets (Compustat #6).  Furthermore, firms with earnings where the current year is below the previous year are 
considered to be the years with bad news.  With deflated earnings defined above, the magnitude of the bad news 
(BAD) is measured as the difference between the current year’s deflated earnings and the previous year’s deflated 
earnings.  The smaller the variable BAD, the worse the expected news.  Lastly, a control variable is included for firm 
size. The control variable is measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the event year. 
 
Financial data were gathered from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database.  Analyst forecast data were 
collected from I/B/E/S database.  As mentioned above, management earnings forecast (annual or quarterly) data 
were taken from the First Call Company Issued Guidance database. 
 
The initial number of skipped firm-years is 1,168.  After a check with newswires, the number of actual 
skipped firm-years is down to 1,085.  Requiring the availability of financial and analyst forecast data, the number of 
sample firm-years engaging in skipped years is further reduced to 690.  On the other hand, after requesting the 
availability of financial and analyst forecast data, the 11,948 regular forecasting control firm-years were reduced to 
3,197. 
 
TEST RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports the univariate statistics of the variables by skipped firm-years and regular forecasting firm-
years.  The Wilcoxon tests show that in contrast to regular forecasting firm-years, the firm that skips a year of 
forecast has missed analysts’ earnings forecast more dramatically in the previous year (Z = -6.43 for MISS).   It also 
shows more volatile earnings in the previous five years (Z = -4.25 for VOLATILE).  Furthermore, the firm that skips 
earnings forecasts tends to be a smaller firm (Z = 7.88 for SIZE) with lower net income (Z = 8.92 for NI). 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Skipped Firm Years Regular Forecasting Firm-Years Between-Group 
 Obs No. Mean Median Obs No. Mean Median t-Test Wilcoxon 
MISS 690 0.1595 0.0145 3197 0.0337 0.0082 -2.82* -6.43* 
VOLATILE 690 0.0731 0.0297 3197 0.0516 0.0232 -3.75* -4.25* 
BAD 690 0.0057 -0.0009 3197 -0.0100 -0.0005 -2.14* 0.22 
SIZE 690 4827.046 651.708 3197 7716.603 1214.066 2.56* 7.88* 
NI 690 187.1526 17.7965 3197 344.5094 51.6920 2.65* 8.92* 
*Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
MISS = the absolute value of the difference between diluted EPS (Compustat #57) and the last analyst’s median 
earnings forecast (I/B/E/S medest), deflated by stock price per share (Compustat #199), in year t-1. 
VOLATILE  = standard deviation of five years of deflated earnings preceding the “skipped” year (year t), where deflated 
earnings is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123) deflated by the end-of-year total assets 
(Compustat #6). 
BAD = the difference between deflated earnings in year t and year t-1, where deflated earnings is defined as 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123) deflated by the end-of-year total assets (Compustat #6). 
SIZE = market value of equity, which is the product of common shares outstanding (Compustat #25) and fiscal 
year-end close price per share (Compustat #199). 
NI = net income (loss) (Compustat #172). 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results from the logit model.  The model is estimated with two different 
groups of firms that skip earnings estimates.  The first estimation (1) uses 690 annual forecasting skipped firm-years 
and 3,197 regular forecasting firm-years.  Following that, 606 (out of 690) firms not only skipped their annual 
earnings forecasts but also their quarterly forecasts.  Therefore, the second estimation (2) uses 606 annual and 
quarterly forecasting skipped firm-years and 3,197 regular forecasting firm-years. 
 
Table 3:  Determinants Of The Decision To Skip A Year Of Forecast 
 
Model:  )()1Pr( 43210   LSIZEBADVOLATILEMISSFSKIP  
 Estimation (1) Estimation (2) 
 
Annual Forecast Skipped Firm-Years versus 
Regular Forecasting Firm-Years 
Annual and Quarterly Forecast Skipped Firm-
Years versus Regular Forecasting Firm-Years 
Intercept 0.3489 
(0.00) 
0.3252 
(0.00) 
MISS 0.0122 
(0.03) 
0.0126 
(0.02) 
VOLATILE 0.0828 
(0.08) 
0.0871 
(0.06) 
BAD 0.0591 
(0.11) 
0.0463 
(0.20) 
LSIZE -0.0249 
(0.00) 
-0.0241 
(0.00) 
Pseudo-R2 2.14% 2.45% 
Dependent variables = 1 if the firm skips a year of forecast and = 0 for a firm who has consistently forecasted its annual earnings.  
Estimation 1 includes the firm-years that have been identified as skipped firm-years for annual earnings, with or without 
quarterly earnings forecast.  On the other hand, Estimation 2 includes only those firm-years that have skipped both annual and 
quarterly earnings forecast.  p-values are reported in parentheses.  Independent variables are defined as follows: 
 
MISS = the absolute value of the difference between diluted EPS (Compustat #57) and the last analyst’s median 
earnings forecast (I/B/E/S medest), deflated by stock price per share (Compustat #199), in year t-1. 
VOLATILE  = standard deviation of five years of deflated earnings preceding the “skipped” year (year t), where deflated 
earnings is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat #123) deflated by the end-of-year total assets 
(Compustat #6). 
BAD = the difference between deflated earnings in year t and year t-1, where deflated earnings is earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat #123) deflated by the end-of-year total assets (Compustat #6). 
LSIZE =  the natural logarithm of market value of equity, which is the product of common shares outstanding 
(Compustat #25) and fiscal year-end close price per share (Compustat #199). 
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The result of the first estimation (1) shows that the likelihood of skipping a year of forecast is significantly 
higher for firms that have performed very differently from analysts’ consensus (coefficient on MISS = 0.0122, z-
statistic = 4.53), even after accounting for firm size.  Further, a firm is more likely to skip a year of annual forecast 
when it has a record of volatile earnings in the previous five years (coefficient on VOLATILE = 0.0828, z-statistic = 
3.04).  The results are even more evident for the group that skips annual and quarterly earnings forecasts in the same 
year (coefficient on MISS = 0.0126, z-statistic = 5.30; coefficient on VOLATILE = 0.0871, z-statistics = 3.63).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study aims at examining whether corporate disclosure policy is “sticky” and, if so, why.  Focusing on 
management annual earnings forecasts, 1,085 earnings forecast year gaps, in which a firm skips a year or more, were 
identified, along with the reasons for this behavior.  Evidence indicates that firms that miss earnings targets (set by 
analysts) by a large margin are more likely to skip a year of earnings forecast.  The results also suggest that earnings 
volatility in the previous five years could play a role.  The findings, however, do not show that incoming bad news 
necessarily acts as a determinant.  In sum, evidence shows that a firm may not stick to its normal earnings forecast 
policy in these circumstances. Missing an earnings target from the previous year and experiencing more volatile 
earnings may cause a firm to skip a year or more of earnings forecasts. 
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